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Statutes That Are Not Static-The
Case of the APA
PETER L. STRAUSS*
•.. [7he lesson of the past two hundredyears is that we will do well to be on our
guard against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our problems. As lawyers we
will do well to be on our guard against any suggestion that, through law, our
society can be reformed,purified, or saved. The function of law, in a society like
our own, is altogether more modest and less apocalyptic. It is to provide a
mechanism for the settlement of disputes in the light of broadly conceived
principles on whose soundness, it must be assumed, there is a general consensus
among us. If the assumption is wrong, if there is no consensus, then we are headed
for war, civil strife, and revolution, and the orderly administrationofjustice will
become an irrelevant, nostalgic whimsy until the socialfabric has been stitched
together again and a new consensus has emerged. But, so long as the consensus
exists, the mechanism which the law provides is designed to insure that our
institutions adjust to change, which is inevitable, in a continuing process which
will be orderly, gradual, and, to the extent that such a thing is possible in human
affairs, rational. The function of the lawyer is to preserve a skeptical relativism in
a society hell-bent for absolutes. When we become too sure of our premises, we
necessarilyfail in what we are supposed to be doing.
When we think of our own or of any other legal system, the beginning of wisdom
lies in the recognition that the body of the law, at any time or place, is an unstable
mass in precariousequilibrium. The study of our legal past is helpful to lawyers
and judges and legislators in the same way that the study of recorded games is
helpful to a chess player. But the principal lesson to be drawn from our study is
that the part of wisdom is to keep our theories open-ended, our assumptions
tentative, our reactionsflexible. We must act, we must decide, we must go this way
or that. Like the blind men dealing with the elephant, we must erect hypotheses on
the basis of inadequateevidence. That does no harm-atall events it is the human
conditionfrom which we will not escape-so long as we do not delude ourselves
into thinking that we havefinally seen our elephant whole. 1

*

Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University.

My thanks are owing to

Columbia colleagues, participants in the University of San Diego Workshop on Statutory
Interpretation and other early readers, Melvin Eisenberg, Daniel Farber, Phillip Frickey,
Gerard Lynch and John Manning among them, who have provided many helpful insights
and suggestions; any deficiencies that remain are mine alone.
1. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 109-10 (1977).

Judges interpreting statutes evidence a certain ambivalence whether
they are interpreting the texts before them as artifacts whose meaning
was fixed as of their date of enactment, or as present-day texts whose
meaning may be shaped by subsequent events-whether intervening
judicial decisions, or the adoption of new statutes (as distinct from
amendments, an easy case) whose instructions bear on the issues they
present. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council stridently referred the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act's rulemaking provision back to the political compromise
struck at its enactment in 1946; the opinion insisted that judges are not
free to vary its terms by common-law improvisations based on their
reasoning about the procedural needs of contemporary rulemaking. Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. 3 almost as
impatiently dismissed the argument that judicial standards for reviewing
agency rulemakings are those that prevailed when the APA was enacted
(equating review of rulemaking with highly permissive review of
economic legislation), rather than the "hard look" understandings that
had grown up in the 1970s, primarily in the D.C. Circuit. The particular
tension has long been a puzzle for administrative law scholars; yet it
seems to reflect a general unease about how judges ought best interpret
Congress's words as they age.
This essay is offered as a modest contribution to these debates.
Reflecting Gilmore's epigram at the head of these pages, it argues that in
its very occasional4 forays into the construction of particular statutes,
whenever the Supreme Court is considering a return to original
understandings it should accord substantial weight to contemporary
consensus the profession and lower courts have been able to develop in
interpreting law. Drawing as well on a similar tension in the writings of
Dean Roscoe Pound,5 it suggests that judges might usefully distinguish
between congressional preferences reflected in subsequent statutes, and
their own preferences developed in and through the common law.
Vermont Yankee repudiated common-law development of the APA's
required rulemaking procedures on the basis simply of judicial preferences
or sensibilities, but that need not entail a repudiation of developments
grounded in subsequently enacted statutes. From this perspective, it is
argued, one could regard a move that understands earlier statutes in the
2.

435 U.S. 519 (1978); see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).

3.

463 U.S. 29 (1983).

4. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of
the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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light shed by later ones as statutory interpretation, not common-law
innovation. From this perspective, such a move, linking judicial to
demonstrable congressional preferences, is the less problematic.
I. THEORY: CONSIDERING THE CONGRESSIONAL-JUDICIAL DIALOG

Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have recently demonstrated
at length that considerations of institutional capacity, and of the possible
dynamic effects of a chosen approach on the future behaviors of the
institutions concerned, are central to any inquiry about statutory interpretation.6
That is, one must analyze the place and functioning both of legislators
and of their possible interpreters; one must do so in the framework both
of the ends of the legal system-predictability of general outcome and
justice in individual cases-and of the dynamic workings of the political
order within which they operate. And one must do so free of "the nirvana
fallacy-the juxtaposition of an idealized picture of [one institution's]
capacities with a grudging picture of the capacities of other actors in the
interpretive system."7 Their ostensible critic and sometime colleague
Judge Posner, basically agreeing with their root propositions, has
reminded us that in this most real of all possible worlds, one must
perform these analyses in relation to the actualities of the American
political system, not some idealized or hypothetically possible alternative.
Interpretation is at best a secondary characteristic of that system. It
cannot be choices about statutory interpretation styles or their dynamic
effects, he argues, that have been
the cause of our tricameral legislative system (tricameral because the veto power
makes the President in effect a third house of Congress), our 200-year-old
Constitution whose authors were sages but not seers, our federal system that
overlays federal law on the legal systems of fifty different states, our weak,
undisciplined political parties, [our long acceptance of the use of common law
processes as appropriate means for defining legal duties], our system of appointing or
electing judges from other branches of the legal profession, including the
academic branch, rather than making judging a career, and the division of
governmental powers between the legislative and executive branches. In a [typical

European] parliamentary system [judging is a lifetime career,] the executive is
selected by and answerable to the legislature, which usually is effectively
unicameral. The result is a very great centralization of government power,

6.

Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101

L. REv. 885 (2003).
7. Id.
at 905.

MICH.

which the United States lacks .... [These differences are] not because of [our
choices regarding] statutory and constitutional construction by judges .... 8

That is, attention to the institutional capacities of interpreters and writers,
and of the dynamic interactions between them, must occur within the
framework of the political institutions and culture we share; and, as
Judge Posner points out, such attention has long characterized the
literature.
Fully accepting the necessity for institutional/dynamic analysis of
statutory interpretation, this essay seeks to place it in a context that
honors three additional considerations: our long-standing political
acceptance of judicial lawmaking (i.e., commonlaw processes and the
associated system of stare decisis); our democratic commitment to the
political superiority of legislation; and the proposition that both
legislation and caselaw development are primarily self-regarding. That
is, to expand briefly upon the third of these, legislators are primarily
concerned with influencing the legislative and not the judicial process;
and judges, correspondingly, are primarily concerned in their lawmaking
with the internal habits and constraints of judicial, not legislative,
process. That legislators may cock an eye to how judges behave, and
vice versa, is secondary to their culture. 9 In the system of stare decisis,

8. Richard A. Posner, The InstitutionalDimension of Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation,101 MICH. L. REv. 952, 961 (2003).
9. Compare Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive
Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005). Vermeule
persuasively calls attention to the difficulties presented if one assumes that a judicial
approach to interpretation that would be desirable if all judges adopted it for all time is
therefore desirable for each individual judge (since we can understand that not all judges
will adopt identical interpretive approaches, at any one time or, especially, across time),
the fallacy of division; and, conversely, that an approach that might be desirable for a
particular judge at a particular time is therefore desirable for all judges at all times (since
the attractiveness of the approach for the individual judge may lie precisely in the
balance it offers to an empirically unstable mix of approaches), the fallacy of composition.
Arguably, however, Vermeule overstresses the legislative-judicial interface, as if it were
primary to the functioning of both institutions; he is insufficiently attentive to the ways
in which a common law culture works within the judiciary to produce approximate
concord in relation to judicial law-making tasks, and the ways in which a culture of
legislating works to similar ends within legislatures.
That both cultures could be corroded-prove unreliable-is undeniable, and one can
certainly point to indicators that it is occurring-the discipline of precedent and
commitment to consistency being arguably overwhelmed as courts of appeal assert the
luxury of rendering decisions that they prohibit counsel from relying upon and testing in
future litigation, even as empirical indicators of partisan patterns of decision appear, see
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts of Appeals: a PreliminaryInvestigation, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
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judges draw on the past decisions of hierarchically superior courts when
reasoning by analogy in unprovided cases; save in the most extraordinary of
circumstances, they predict the future only from these past deposits of
action-not, as such, what they think a superior court likely to do,
independent of these indicators. Similarly it is in the nature of a court to
draw on the past actions of the (hierarchically superior) legislature in
reasoning to a conclusion about a matter not clearly provided for, rather
than to predict, as such, what the contemporary legislature might be
expected to do about the matter. The greater volatility of legislatures
makes this conventional judicial regard for the significance of past
resolutions and instructions the more important. Policies that have been
established, not those that might be, are the central consideration.
The institutional/dynamic perspective captures a certain dialogic
quality in the workings over time of legislatures and courts. Whether by
common-law reasoning alone or by interpretation, courts develop law by
the percolation and development of principle through hierarchically
organized judicial systems that bring uncertainties into increasingly
focused and prominent view. Legislatures similarly respond to social
controversies that rise to the surface. Outside the special ambit of
constitutional concerns, which will not trouble us here, legislative
modification (one might say, correction) of common law or interpretive
results has a conversational quality."0 Even assuming a certain legislative
volatility and the slack created by institutional obstacles to new
legislation,1" one would expect judicial responsiveness to legislative
signals to generate less new legislative business than judicial resistance
to them, or even ignoring of them. Low levels of legislative effort to
academics/publiclaw/resources/50.crs.voting.pdf (visited Nov. 26, 2003); the accountability
of legislative behaviors similarly disappears in the face of thousand-page statutory drafts
presented without realistic opportunity for reading much less debate, filled with special
interest provisions for which no legislator may be willing to acknowledge responsibility.
Yet this possibility could hardly be a matter of indifference to any member of our polity;
and Vermeule's approach risks suggesting that this outcome is objectively inevitable, and
not subject to influence by social and cultural norms. Cf Peter L. Strauss, Educating
Citizens, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 690 (2002).
10. For an unusually attentive (and unanimous) Supreme Court opinion in this
respect, see Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S.Ct 1836 (U.S. 2004).
11.
Legislatures may fail to act not only because judges have correctly identified
the policies that would actually be enacted, but merely because they have found a
decision point within the area of slack legislative veto-gates provide. See, e.g., Mathew
McCubbins, Roger Noll & Barry Weingast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation,57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994).

modify judicial outcomes signal judicial success from this institutional
perspective; when levels of effort are high, when it appears that
Congress repeatedly works to modify or correct judicial outcomes in a
given area of concern, that may be taken as a sign of institutional failure.
Given the normative superiority of legislative over judicial output, I
suggest, patterns of repeated struggle between legislators and interpreters
ordinarily suggest interpretive failure; patterns of acceptance of interpretive
outputs, albeit less strongly, success.2
Scholars writing about judges interpreting statutes disagree about
much, yet generally agree on some propositions. Apart from questions
of constitutionality, few assert that judges are superior or even equal
law-makers to the legislature. Propositions embodied in legislation must
dominate judicial preferences. Courts fighting or displacing legislative
judgments, unless warranted by such concerns as ordinarily we associate
with the Constitution," are 'acting beyond their proper sphere. In an
ideal state, judicial interpretations would never, in themselves, perturb
legislative deliberations. In the ongoing back-and-forth between the
rule-generation that is legislation and rule-application that is adjudication,
the appliers' success in implementing the instructions they have received
would be reflected in a lack of need for reiteration of the instructions. A
metaphor of "faithful servant" is often used; and that metaphor does not
fit an actor constantly quarreling with, manipulating, or second-guessing
her instructions, or imposing on them linguistic preferences that are
personal to the servant rather than a fair reflection of the master's

12.
Supra note 9. These are proposed measures of system dynamics only, not of
justice achieved. Nazi judges may have interpreted German statutes in ways that
extended their anti-Semitic reach considerably; but there is no sign that the German
government or (at the time) Volk found this objectionable. Conversely, some judges in
apartheid South Africa employed formalist techniques to frustrate its legislation; this
normatively praiseworthy, even heroic activity was, from a systemic, institutional
perspective-and the perspective of the Boers who then dominated South Africa's
political institutions-highly inappropriate.

13.

The point is put in this guarded way to recognize that in some contexts, such as

citizenship issues, courts recognizing plenary congressional authority have nonetheless
developed widely accepted interpretive approaches favoring quasi-constitutional
individual claims. E.g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). One could think

that in these cases courts are responding to primary norms of justice, rather than systemic
considerations, cf supra note 12. In Girouard, for example, the majority relies on strong,
constitutionally grounded First Amendment values in overruling prior statutory interpretations
that (because they dealt with immigration and citizenship) were concededly within
Congress's power; the dissent, written by a Justice who had dissented fervently from the
initial statutory readings, relied on the institutional consideration that Congress had had
the Court's earlier rulings forcefully called to its attentions, had had several occasions to
correct any error, and in reenacting the language concerned had failed to do so.
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usage. 14 The properly subordinate status of judges in this respect is not
at issue.
The "faithful servant" metaphor may express the inferiority of judicial
lawmaking, the necessary subordination of judicial judgment to legislative
instructions, but it is imperfect in a number of important respects.
Inevitably (because time is a limited resource and because language and
foresight are imperfect), and sometimes not to their credit (that is, to
avoid resolving problems they actually do identify but choose for
political or other reasons not to deal with), legislatures "write with
stubby crayons."' 5 A good deal of that imprecision is attributable to the
fact that, as many have pointed out, describing a legislature as "a"
master is incoherent;' 6 the United States Congress acts through the votes
of its 535 members, whose agreement even on the language it enacts
is never better than formal.' 7 As important, the judicial servant has
no continuing relationship with the enacting body, through which
understandings might emerge over time; its original master has
departed the scene. The legislature that writes goes out of session, and
the judges who apply its instructions generally do so while a different
legislature is sitting; in the interim, legislative politics may have
changed, new and unforeseen problems may have arisen, and the general

14.
"Like a union that works to rule, a judge who uses the methodology of strict
textualism steps out of the proper subordinate status to unfaithfully frustrate the
legislation that the judge is institutionally bound to further. Strict textualism reflects not
the obedience that the court owes to the legislature, but an improper and indeed arrogant
move by a subordinate to assume a role that is equal or even dominant to that of his
master." Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LOYOLA OF L.A. L. REv. 13, 37-38
(1995); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REv.
225, 250-52 (1999).
None of this is to deny that there may be extraordinary
circumstances in which the judge's obligations to higher principle command such
obstructionism, cf supra note 12, but in such circumstances there must be reasons that
command disobedience.
15.
Gerard E. Lynch, What Judges Do, Part I,in CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGAL
METHODS 644 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2003).
16.
That is, the legislature is a multitude not an individual, hardly capable of
having either an objective single intention or an objective single understanding regarding
the texts it adopts, even before we begin to consider the further complications introduced
by bicameralism and the usual need for executive approval. See, e.g., Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870-71 (1930).
17.
Consider, for example, massive omnibus budget reconciliation legislation
reaching the floor of Congress in unreadable reams of assembled papers, into which
members have often enough slipped important--or trivial-provisions. Cf Sorenson v.
Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 866 and 867 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (1986).

legal framework may also have changed, as by the enactment of new
statutes. The actions of this new legislature are influenced by
contemporary politics-importantly including the usual necessity of
securing presidential or gubernatorial support for any new legislation, as
well as overcoming the many internal barriers that may be raised to
success. Perhaps most important, then, is that the judiciary's new
nominal "master" is limited in its possibilities for response. The friction
in the legislative system makes it likely that a range of possible judicial
interpretations of the existing legislation will be left undisturbed-that
is, today's legislators will not succeed in forming the coalitions
necessary to successful legislative business for all deviations from their
constructive wishes, but only some of them. Judges cannot be controlled
by the enacting legislature (which no longer exists); and they have
effective power to deviate to some degree from the instructions a
contemporary legislature would hypothetically give them.
How, then, is one to maintain the ethos of judicial subservience?
Perhaps it is appropriate to begin by noticing an artificiality in the
question, later returned to-that it focuses attention on interpretation to
the exclusion of other judicial law-declaring functions, notably those
associated with the common law. 8 Separating the realms of "[judicial]
judgment" and "[political] Will"' 9 is a general problem in relation to a
judiciary entrusted with resolving legal questions not yet answered, in a
manner that will command the future. The general resolution, satisfying
or not, is framed self-referentially, in relation to the culture and
obligations of judges and judging rather than their connections to any
external institution-whether to the legislature or directly to the people
in some political sense. Nonetheless, legislative creation of a text is
conventionally taken to frame the issue in a distinctive way, and for the
moment at least this essay will proceed in that light.
In asking how the ethos of subservience to the legislature (legitimately
expressed political will) may be maintained, it is perhaps appropriate to
note that perceptions that the courts had been failing to do so animated
the constitutional crises of the New Deal... and resulted in the adoption,
for a time, of apologetic techniques of interpretation so assiduous in
their attention to the details of congressional business as arguably to
corrupt the legislative process. By elevating the importance of legislative
18.
And, as Melvin Eisenberg has noted, the similar questions that arise in the
context of the private "law" created by contract. The Emergence of Dynamic Contract
Law, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1745, 1749 (2000).
19. The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton); that, empirically, one may doubt the
completeness of the separation across many if not all arenas of legal dispute, see
Sunstein et al., supra note 6, does not undercut the aspiration or its normative thrust.

[Vol. 14: 767, 20051

Statutes That Are Not Static
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

history materials, the courts encouraged participants in the legislative
process to attempt to achieve through the creation of "legislative history"
ends that they may not have had the capacity to shepherd through the
legislative obstacle course of bicameralism and presentment. 20 This
outcome-reaction to which substantially explains the present judicial
caution in using legislative history materials-suggests the importance
of the interactive quality of the judicial-legislative relationship.
Legislatures learn from the techniques judges use, and adapt their
approaches to them, and vice versa.21
No technique judges might use in interpretation will either defeat this
dialogic quality or eliminate the area of slack created by the
institutional/political obstacles to legislation, which an unprincipled judge
might exploit to pursue private ends.22 Take, for example, the ostensible
self-denial of rigid formalism. A court taking this approach will address
only the words the legislature has adopted, given meanings appropriate

20.
See John Manning, Textualism as a Non-Delegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673 (1997). This essay is not the place in which to explore the continuing
arguments over the proper place (if any) of legislative history in statutory interpretation,
and so does not engage Prof. Manning's extensive scholarship on textualism, as such.
See also, e.g., Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001).
The statement in text should not be taken as a statement about the frequency with which
participants in legislative processes attempt to influence judges and other outsiders
through legislative history, relative to their efforts to influence those processes
themselves. Many have remarked on the institutional purposes served by legislative
history, and the institutional safeguards favoring internally-regarding uses. Internallyregarding legislative history materials can illuminate the "masters"' understanding of an
adopted text, revealing problems identified, considerations addressed (and overlooked),
understood purposes and expected effects, etc. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992). Yet one can
deny neither the possibility of manipulative (i.e., externally-regarding) uses nor the
added incentives given for such manipulation by close judicial attention to the resulting
materials.
21.
Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 69 U. CHi.L.REv. 149
(2001).
22.
In Judge Posner's words, "the irresponsible judge will twist any approach to
yield the outcomes that he desires and the stupid judge will do the same thing
unconsciously." Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation,50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817
(1983). It is hardly my purpose to substitute for the "nirvana fantasy," Sunstein et al.,
supra note 6. However, the cynical proposition that judges and legislators will inevitably
pursue ends more selfish than the culture in which they have grown up prepares them
for. See Educating Citizens, supra note 9. Granted that we must prepare for the reality
that men are not angels, James A. Madison, The Federalist #51, to assume that we must
have so selfish a state is to invite that state.

to that time, and leaving to future legislatures-courts have no business
"making law"-the correction of any problems that result. It should be
obvious nonetheless that the court's interpretation inevitably does "make
law"; a meaning that was not previously known as certain has now been
fixed.2 3 And, as history has taught, the meaning assigned by the court
may be insupportably narrow, propelled by its own sense of appropriate
outcome or policy.24 That interpretation, too, will "stick" despite its
palpable inadequacy unless the obstacles to new legislation can be
overcome. Legislatures repeatedly faced with the problems thus presented,
and attempting to avoid them for the future, may find their time
consumed by the enactment of statutes of exquisite prolixity-and
corresponding incomprehensibility to the common public.
The British spirit of civil liberty induced the English judges to adhere strictly to
the law, to its exact expressions. This again induced the law-makers to be, in their
phraseology, as explicit and minute as possible, which causes such a tautology and
endless repetition in the statutes of that country that even so eminent a statesman
as Sir Robert Peel declared, in parliament, that he "contemplates no25 task with so
much distaste as the reading through an ordinary act of parliament."

Francis Lieber's observations about the impacts of nineteenth century
judicial formalism, just quoted, are a part of the exposition that established
the "faithful servant" metaphor in our rhetorical vocabulary on the
subject of statutory interpretation. Despite its ambiguities, the metaphor
23.
The Supreme Court has given this proposition particularly emphatic form,
Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996). This is not a necessary outcome; judges in
civil law systems profess a much looser attitude toward their earlier readings of statutory
text. Yet the habitual disciplines of common law courts make it an understandable one.
24. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 117 F. 462 (8th Cir. 1902), reversed 196 U.S.
1 (1904), is a classic example from the United States' earlier formalist period, cf HENRY
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1133 ff. (Eskridge & Frickey eds., 1994).

More

recently, the court-congressional struggles over reimbursement of prevailing party
expenses in public interest litigation, such as West Virginia University Hospitals v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), cf Philip Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation,77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 264-67 (1992) and
Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Comment on
Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of
Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687 (1992); see also Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
25.

FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 28-31 (1839). Judicial

(mis)behaviors are not the only ones that can inspire such reactions. Members of the
legislature presumably think executive branch and agency officials also ought to be
acting as "faithful servants." It is not hard to understand some recent Congresses'
extraordinary prolixity in legislation as, at least in part, a reaction to patterns of
enforcement by executive branch and agency officials that, in an era often characterized
by "divided government," disappoint these expectations.
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captures important aspects of the problem in'
its larger dimension: the
necessary subservience of judges to legislative instruction, and the
enduring and interactive character of the legislative-judicial relationship
across a wide range of subjects. It suggests, as well, a measure of success in
the relationship-that the servant does not act to create friction in the
relationship; it self-consciously takes the attitude of a fiduciary rather
than an opportunist toward the inevitable slack in its instructions.
For some, this proposition could raise important political and
institutional questions. At what point might the consistently successful
decisions of the "servant" serve to defeat the discipline or responsibility
of his master? Could they permit his master to avoid having to give
instructions at all,26 and even permit her a certain degree of laziness or
evasion of responsibility? Since the metaphoric master here is also a
servant-of the electors-and may herself be held accountable by her
masters (and to an extent the judicial "servant" may not), his uninstructed
resolution of issues arguably serves to defeat the intended political
controls on her behavior. Making the legislature decide issues is good
for democracy, this argument runs-the judicial servant is answering to
a different master (the sovereign people)
in refusing to do what is
"properly" the legislature's business.2 7
Then there is the problem of differentiating between reasoning by
analogy from the instructions actually given, and purporting to anticipate
what a contemporary legislature might do about the problem not directly
provided for. This is a tension not easy to resolve-a matter perhaps of
internal discipline or characterization. In the Progressive Era, Roscoe
Pound inveighed one year in the Columbia Law Review against
"spurious interpretation," that "puts a meaning into the text as a juggler
puts coins ...into a dummy's hair, to be pulled forth presently with an
air of discovery. It is essentially a legislative, not a'judicial process...
an anachronism in an age of legislation."28 Yet the following year, his
essay in the Harvard Law Review championed as the most desirable way
for judges to "deal with a legislative innovation" receiving a statute

26.

Consider, for example, the Nineteenth Century judicial development of the

fellow servant exception to a principal's responsibilities for his agent's torts; legislative
address of the issues dealt with by such holdings as Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep.
1030 (Exch. Pleas 1837) and Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49
(1842) did not begin for decades.
27.
28.

Cf DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993).
Roscoe Pound, Spurious Legislation, 7 COLUM. L. REv. 379, 381 (1907).

"fully into the body of the law as affording not only a rule to be applied but a
principle from which to reason, and hold it, as a later and more direct expression
of the general will, of superior authority to judge-made rules on 29the same general
subject; and so reason from it by analogy in preference to them."

This openness to dynamic interpretation was the way, he argued, to
which "the course of legal development upon which we have entered
already must lead us." One may suppose the two positions consistent,
but difficult, in just the ways suggested here.
The argument that judges following Pound's second, ideal course will
weaken the legislative process by dealing imaginatively and sympathetically
with the statutes in hand, one colleague has suggested, smells of the
lamp. One may perhaps be excused for thinking that on those few
occasions when judicial developments have genuinely engaged public
sentiment, on abortion say, the public has not been discouraged from
holding their legislators to account by the fact that judges have reached a
conclusion. In general, however, and from the perspective of this essay,
the modal case is not a matter in high controversy, but one of those
issues of detail we could not reasonably expect politicians will be held to
answer for.3" Perhaps judicial opinion will tip the balance on a closely
contested issue-less likely as a product of its mere existence than of its
reason-but if it does then what the public presses for will have been
changed, and it is unclear legislative responsibility will have been
defeated. Given our taste for incumbency, and the volume of legislative
business, the argument that judicial decision corrodes democracy is
weak at best.
A similar question has been bruited for years as a matter of
constitutional law, the "delegation" question, and it has been argued
along similar lines. Aren't there policy judgments so fundamental that
they must be resolved by the legislature and cannot lawfully be left to
others-in this case, executive (agency) rather than judicial officials? In
theory the answer to this question is that such limits do exist; in practice
courts have been unable to articulate meaningful, judicially administrable
standards for enforcing them. No one seriously argues that matters of
every-day routine must be legislatively resolved, and very few situations
have provoked even individual judicial expressions of doubt about the
adequacy of legislative effort. If it is not hard to imagine judicial
reluctance to become complicit in legislative evasions of responsibility
for major issues, judicial insistence that all issues be legislatively
resolved would be insupportable. As with delegation, minute judicial
29.
(1908).
30.

Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383, 385-86
See GILMORE, supra note 1.

[Vol. 14: 767, 2005]

Statutes That Are Not Static
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

attention to what is "properly" the legislature's business is inconsistent
with the judicial subservience that constitutes agreed ground. It threatens
constant political struggles and imposes on the legislature a definition of
its task impossible to fulfill. And, again, a judicially administrable
standard for distinguishing what the legislature must decide from what it
may leave to others is not readily constructed.
Sharing the concerns Sunstein and Vermuele have expressed for
institutional approaches to interpretive issues, I conclude that a properly
functioning judiciary, like Lieber's faithful servant, should rarely, by its
own actions, create business for a contemporary legislature. Ordinarily
-that is, absent the justifications that might be provided by an unjust
order, or reliable and important indications that judicial initiative would
affirmatively encourage legislative ducking of responsibility for political
issues of central importance-the optimal interpretive approach is the
one that least often produces legislative business, because its declarations
what the law "is" so well match contemporary understandings about the
law. An interpretive approach is suboptimal to the degree it requires the
diversion of legislative resources from contemporary social problems
with which the legislature might have to deal independent of judicial
actions, to matters that were not in significant social controversy prior to
judicial interpretation-that is, to social problems created by interpretation.
This measure addresses the dynamics of legislative-judicial interaction
in relation to the results of adjudication, not its implications for internal
legislative processes. Much of the current literature about statutory
interpretation and the problem of legislative history discusses the matter
as if there were a single statute, whose meaning had been fixed at the
moment of enactment. Implicitly if not explicitly, the question for the
court is finding that meaning, and the issues for debate concern what (if
any) bearing to give to the statute's language, purpose and political
history in performing that task. To the extent these commentators worry
about feedback between the interpretive and legislative process as a
possible consideration influencing these interpretive choices, they
present the issue in terms of singular statutes, similarly viewed. Thus,
Daniel Rodriguez and Barry Weingast recently argued for careful
judicial attention to the political compromises that may have persuaded
moderates to support a controversial statute, in preference to linguistic
approaches that ignore these undertakings, or purposive styles that might
tend to privilege the views of the statute's ardent congressional supporters.3 1
31.

Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of

"When courts fail to respect legislative bargains," they urge, "moderates
are deterred from compromise" and the result may be to "make historic
social legislation less likely., 32 Yet very few statutes are controversial
in this way; and for those that are, it would be hard to establish that
legislative action is much influenced by general expectations about how
courts will treat the hidden (implicit) deals they may embody.33
Note too that this perspective accepts a "fire alarm" view of legislative
activity that fits more comfortably with Anglo-American than continental
legislative traditions.34 Most often for us (as is probably also the case in
fact if not in theory on the continent) legislation shares with litigation
the quality of responding pragmatically to a single distinct social
problem that has emerged against the backdrop of contemporary law
revealed to be inadequate in some particular; much less frequently does
legislation attempt a comprehensive and theoretically grounded synthesis of
an entire domain of law. It is typically a reaction to a particular social
problem, rather than an effort to organize all aspects of legal relations in
a coherent way. This quality produces much of the work and feel of
American statutory interpretation. As the legislature has rarely sought
reconciliation of the statute it enacts with the existing body of statutory
law, it is the judge who faces the work of reconciliation, of creating
coherence (or at least as much of it as the legislative texts will permit).35
Correspondingly, this perspective makes little distinction between the
traditional domains of statutory and common law. If judges framing the
common law of torts or contracts depart significantly from contemporary
expectations, that will produce legislative business just as judicial
(mis)applications of an aging statute will. Both because of its institutional
commitment to precedent (i.e., the views of ages past) and because the
appellate judiciary tends to be elderly, common law will generally
follow rather than lead social change. For the same reason, some degree

Legislative History: New Perspectiveson the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation,151
U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003).

Id. at 1530.
33.
For a persuasive argument that, as a normative matter, legislation would be
improved were courts to ignore the possibility of such deals, and treat statutes strictly in
terms of their explicit public-regarding purposes, see Jon Macey, Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest-Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
34. See Posner, supra note 8.
35.
In the words of Harlan Fiske Stone, " to realize.., the ideal of a unified
system of judge-made and statute law woven into a seamless whole by the processes of
adjudication." The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1936). The
dominating contemporary view is that realizing this vision would be, at best, a
Sisyphisean task, that coherence in fact is not to be found.
32.
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of legislative modification of the common law's content is only to be

expected; but judicial resistance to such changes has at times created the
need for more (and perhaps more comprehensive) legislation than
thoughtful judicial attention to contemporary legislative purposes and
trends would have required. 6 Such friction is, in my judgment, a paradigmatic
example of "diversion of legislative resources from contemporary social
problems with which the legislature might have to deal independent of
judicial actions, to matters that were not in significant social controversy
prior to judicial interpretation--to social problems created by interpretation."
Common law generation, like statutory interpretation, is an activity that
occurs subordinate to the legislative enterprise and in constant
"conversational" contact with it. Both are susceptible of imposing higher or
lower costs on the hierarchically superior legislative enterprise, and in
both cases those costs reflect a heightened level of social controversy to
which judicial law-finding (i.e., judicial law-making) contributes. For
both, worries about judges pursuing their own ends are often voiced; and
for both the best we may be able to hope for-with some reassurance
from history-is the "taught tradition"3 7 that the judiciary's task is to
seek the best fit with the American project as reflected in the existing
body of contemporary law, taken as a whole.
Here, then, the focus is not on the compromises that permitted
enactment of a particular controversial statute, but on a more general
proposition: that the legal framework as a whole changes as a statute
ages-not only because the statute itself may previously have been
interpreted, but also as common law develops and as new statutes are
enacted. On occasion, attention to these changes will lead a court to
adopt an interpretation of particular language in an aging statute that is
quite different from the original enactors' likely understanding, yet
consistent with those changes and thus unlikely to provoke social
controversy. Conversely, in certain cases a court can understand that its
insistence on the meaning that can be attributed to the original enactors
will likely serve to distract legislative attention from independently
existing social problems to one that this interpretation will have
generated.
Note that this claim is a relatively weak one. Its focus, as all judicial
36. As, when legislatures began at last to react against the fellow servant doctrine,
and other elements developed by common law courts in relation to workplace injury.
37. Roscoe Pound, Economic Interpretationand the Law of Torts, 53 HARv. L.
REV.365, 374 (1940); and see GILMORE, supra note 1.

focus, is primarily retrospective-on what past legislatures and courts
have provided. Although trends in those provisions may unmistakably,
in themselves, reveal the irreversible erosion of some principle, only that
demonstrable erosion, not anticipation of what a hierarchically superior
court or legislature might choose, can justify the abandonment of that
principle. In other settings, attention to change will indicate no clear
trend, or reveal an existing social controversy courts will lack the
confidence or sense of political place to resolve. Thus, the claim made
here does not exclude the proposition that some issues are better left to
legislatures. But other issues, it is here asserted, can appropriately be
resolved by courts, even courts aware that, in the absence of the
contemporary developments on which it relies, a different interpretation
would better fit the statute's language.
Note, too, that the claim assumes a legal surface marked by relatively
uncontroversial general consensus at the time of judicial decision. Its
postulate was, "[t]he optimal interpretive approach is the one that least
often produces legislative business, because its declarations what the law
'is' so well match contemporary understandings about the law." But this
way of putting it assumes a degree of cohesion in contemporary
assessment that may often be wanting. Another distinguished group of
political science and legal scholars, John Ferejohn, Neeta Ghandi, and
William Eskridge, are developing an analysis of what they call
"strategic" interpretation-again centered on federal civil rights statutes
-that focuses attention on the practical barriers to legislative correction
of judicial (mis)interpretations.38 As they have persuasively shown us,
the requirement that President, House and Senate must agree on the text
of any new legislation, and the fact that any legislative act imposes as an
opportunity cost that other action must be foregone, in effect create an
area of slack within which courts can frame their interpretations without
having to fear legislative correction. They reasonably characterize this
interpretive space as one within which judges freely pursue their
personal agendas. What is "strategic" about judges' use of the opportunities
thus presented is that their interest in preserving the legitimacy of their
function in the public's eye over the longer term should lead them to
forego interpretations that would serve their personal ideological
preferences, but likely produce a public uproar and be successfully
reversed. This explains Justices' occasional votes "against" stereotype;
they maximize their opportunities to make interpretations a neutral
observer might think best explained by ideological preference, it is
38. See William N. Eskridge Jr., John Ferejohn & Neeta Gandhi, Strategic
Statutory Interpretation,Paper presented at Modeling the Constitution Conference (May
17, 2003) (on file with authors).
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argued, by doing so only when it is "safe."
This way of framing matters, completely understandable in conventional
"public choice" terms, has the effect of bringing Holmes' famous
aphorism about the "bad man" and the law to bear on judges. Its premise is
that the interest of judges lies in understanding what they can get away
with in advancing their personal ideologies-maximizing that space by
strategically foregoing those preferences that in all probability they
could not successfully implant in the law for the longer term, and thus
appearing to deserve public reputations for objectivity and freedom from
political agenda. The authors present an imaginative and rigorous analysis
of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Civil Rights statutes, that
appears to demonstrate just such trimming of judicial sails when congressional
and presidential politics augur (or have recently demonstrated) likely
correction of the Justices' preferred ideological bent, and no such
trimming when they do not.
Their essay and this one share the perspective that much interpretation
occurs in the context of current understandings about the law and sound
policy-what Professor Eskridge has long labeled "dynamic statutory
construction." Where they differ is in disposition to start with Holmes'
cynical acid or not. Their analysis constructs a general theory about
interpretation on a foundation shaped by the most difficult of casesinterpretation of statutes like the Civil Rights Act, caught up with the
deepest political struggles and divisions of our time-in the most
political of courts, the Supreme Court. Here, the supposition is that such
a data set is rather distorting.39 Descriptively, cases in the Supreme
39. Daniel Farber makes a similar point in his contribution to the rich symposium
on Eskridge's work to be found in "Issues in Legal Scholarship-Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation", at http://www.bepress.com, EARTHQUAKES AND TREMORS IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE DYNAMICS OF INTERPRETATION 18 (2002).

"[T]he opinions that are likely to come to a law professor's mind as typical are likely to
be quite different from those that a judge or litigator would find typical." Id. at 15-16.
After a thoughtful and detailed empirical exploration of citation frequency for two
Terms' statutory interpretation cases, Prof. Farber found that the Supreme Court
opinions most frequently cited in the academic literature involved "discrimination" and
other politically "hot" issues (e.g., abortion counseling restrictions); the cases most often
cited by judges involved important procedural issues (e.g., the burden of proof in certain
bankruptcy procedures). Id. at 11-12, 15 nn. 48-49, 51-52. The academic citation
patterns probably reflect considerations that move the public generally-are a marker for
political importance; the judicial citation patterns may reflect issues having a greater
operation-of-the-legal-system importance. If one explored the two sets independently, as
neither of us has yet done, one might well find different techniques being habitually

Court are the most difficult our legal system considers, getting there only
through the obstacles and expense of repeated litigation and, finally, the
Court's affirmative choice to hear this dispute rather than others of the
thousands hopefully presented to it on petitions for the writ of certiorari.
Normatively, a judge whose motivation is to maximize the slack within
which to pursue her personal ideology is a "bad judge" in the same sense
that Holmes's inquirer about the common law was a "bad man"; one should
be aware of her existence, even take some sensible precautions against
her,4" but understand that the general success of the system depends on
the general predominance of "good" men and women who do not test it
in this way, who generally seek the center rather than the fringe.
The more usual interpretive problem, this essay posits, does not
involve politically explosive issues. It arises in routine not exceptional
cases; it requires ordinary lawyers and judges to reach conclusions that
inevitably (and desirably) are grounded in their contemporary understanding
of the legal order as a whole, as well as the specifics of the particular
issue before them. In this context, as my colleague and U.S. District
Court Judge Gerard Lynch remarked in an informal paper he presented
discussing a then-recent opinion of his,4' professional consensus about a
point of interpretation is a stabilizing element.
By the time three [district court judges] had adopted [a particular interpretation of

a narrow statutory point,] it would be, as Arlo Guthrie tells us, a movement. More
important, at some point it would almost certainly be "the law." Whether Scalia,

or Easterbrook, or Posner, would think it the correct outcome, until and unless
some bold litigant managed to challenge the consensus by taking the issue to a
higher court, most lawyers would advise clients against a claim that flew in the
teeth of the "universal consensus" of the decided cases.
It's not a question academics are likely to write about. It's not likely to reach the
Supreme Court (note that while the statute has been interpreted seven or eight
times by trial-level courts and the Appellate Division, nobody's ever pushed the
issue as far as the Second Circuit or New York's Court of Appeals). It would just

be, for lawyers and their clients, the law.

For such issues, one need hardly add, legislative forces are unlikely to
gather... unless the eventual invocation of a higher court produces results
so discordant with the evolved consensus as to reveal a problem where
none had previously been perceived.
employed, or different levels of controversy (as expressed by dissent frequency, the
incidence of 5-4 splits, etc.). Cf Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the
CoordinatingFunction of Plain Meaning, 1990 S. CT. REv. 231, 254.
40.
See Madison, supra note 22.
41.
"What Judges Do, Part I," discussing Collette v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt
Hospital, 132 F. Supp. 2d 256 (SDNY 2001).
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The claim being advanced here is a modest one-only, that the
evolution of law subsequent to a statute's enactment is an appropriate
element for consideration in interpreting it, and that judges should be
cautious in their interpretations against reaching results that are more,
rather than less, likely to require legislative correction given currently
prevailing policy frameworks. Consistent directions taken by Congress since
enactment of a statute, and apparently uncontroversial developments in
judicial interpretation, are both important data sets bearing on the
question how to interpret. They operate properly as constraints on a judge's
formal freedom to choose among the various meanings a particular
statute's language leaves open. "Legislators too often write with stubby
crayons."
II. FROM

ABSTRACT TO CONCRETE

These propositions can perhaps be illustrated by attention to the
interaction of two statutes that show few traces of the congressional
infighting that characterized the Civil Rights Act of 1964-the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 [APA], and the Freedom of
Information Act of 1966 [FOIA]. Although the APA was preceded by a
lengthy period of study and development,4 2 it was not significantly
debated as legislation and it passed both houses of Congress without
dissent. FOLA, similarly, was enacted after a good deal of consultation
between the executive and legislative branches, but without significant
intra-congressional controversy.4 3 For both statutes, the records suggest,
virtually all legislators were ardent supporters; ardent opponents were
few if any, and conciliating legislative moderates was neither very
visible nor apparently necessary. Congress demonstrated the strength of
its commitment to FOIA, in particular, when-in reaction to what it
perceived as slow agency (and, to an extent, judicial) compliance-it
strongly reiterated the policies of the FOIA in 1974 amendments and in
the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976.
Among the innovations of the APA was its articulation in what is
now 5 U.S.C. § 553 of a uniform procedure for notice-and-comment
rulemaking. The procedure included the following provisions for
notice, never since amended:
42.

Walter Gellhorn, Symposium on the 50th Anniversary of the APA: Birth Pangs

of the Administrative ProcedureAct, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 51 (1996).
43. The vote in the House was 308 yeas, 0 nays, and 125 abstaining. 112 CONG.
REC. 13661 (June 30, 1966). The Senate vote was not recorded, itself a signal of consensus.

(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or
otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall
include(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.

In neither the 1947 Attorney General's Manual (frequently used by
courts as a near-definitive marker of legislative meaning) nor the preenactment legislative history does the discussion of these provisions
suggest an expectation about notice different from what these words
convey-that notice could validly be rather general and unspecific about
the rule being proposed. Note in (3) the repeated use of the disjunctive
"or" to describe the necessary content of "notice" so far as the substance
of the proposal was concerned. "[E]ither the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved." It
would have been surprising to have been told, in 1946, that a necessary
condition of valid rulemaking was that agencies disclose-in advance of
the opportunity for comment this notice serves to announce-the
scientific data or reports known to them, and on which the rulemaking
being proposed would be likely to rely.
The APA contained no provisions by which people could require
agencies to disclose any scientific data or reports they possessed. Such
provisions first entered the statute books in 1966, twenty years later,
with the adoption of FOIA. FOIA enabled "any person" to require an
agency to "make . . . promptly available" to her all "records" that
her "request... reasonably describes., 4 4 Limited exemptions were stated,
but one may say summarily here that these exemptions would reach few
if any records containing scientific data or reports an agency would
consult in connection with rulemakings. The 1974 amendments to FOIA
reflected Congress's strong perception that agencies had proved too
resistant to FOIA disclosure generally, by adding that even if an
exemption were available for some material in a given agency record,
"Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any
person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are
exempt under this subsection. '45 A FOIA request for "all scientific data
or reports known to the agency to be relevant to its proposed rulemaking
on X announced in the Federal Register of [date]" would surely fit the
statutory terms, "reasonably describes." Anyone, whether a participant
44.
45.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
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in the rulemaking or not, would be able to use FOIA to obtain those
records.
"Whether a participant in the rulemaking or not" is an important
qualification to the last sentence. As a statutory matter, FOIA created a
stand-alone remedy. It neither required a requester's participation in
some other administrative proceeding (or any other demonstration of
need for the documents requested, beyond curiosity about them) nor
gave special standing to such participation. The courts early and
uncontroversially denied the existence of any linkage between FOIA
requests and other administrative proceedings. While FOIA itself required
very prompt agency response to requests (a promise frequently broken,
and not much enforced), parties who tried to use FOIA as a discovery
tool quickly found that doing so earned them no right to the
postponement of the proceedings they hoped to use their findings to
influence.4 6 A requester needn't demonstrate need in order to invoke
FOIA; yet neither could she invoke the utility of FOIA in connection
with other proceedings to delay their moving forward. They were
independent of one another. These conclusions sat well with Congress,
which has not revisited them.
During the same period as saw enactment of FOIA and its reinforcing
amendments, federal agencies were making increasing use of APA
rulemaking procedures. To a degree unanticipated in 1946, because
associated with an explosion of new statutes enacted from the mid-60's
onward, they were using rulemaking to resolve issues for which
scientific and technical data and reports had great salience-what
parameters for the elements of a nuclear power plant would assure that it
could operate with safety to the public? What parameters of time,
temperature and salinity in processing smoked fish would protect the
public against botulism? Did the state of technology permit prompt
implementation of measures to reduce automobile exhaust emissions of
pollutants? Should automobiles be required to contain seat-belts or
other protective apparatus and, if so, what devices, how tested, would
qualify? This increasing use of rulemaking procedures led, in turn, to
46.
NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 142, 144 (1975). ("Sears' rights
under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that it claims an
interest in the Advice and Appeals Memoranda greater than that shared by the average
member of the public. The Act is fundamentally designed to inform the public about
agency action and not to benefit private litigants.") (citations omitted); Renegotiation
Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
NLRB, 473 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

frequent invocations of the courts for rulemaking review. The decade
1966-1976 was marked by many important decisions in the Supreme
Court and the circuit courts interpreting the APA, most often in the
direction of heightened public participation and heightened judicial
control.
The Supreme Court's contributions included decisions facilitating preenforcement review of rulemaking,47 expansively defining the standing
necessary to obtain judicial review,48 and expansively characterizing the
scope of review appropriate to decisions, like notice-and-comment
rulemaking, that were not decided on the basis of a trial-like record.4 9
Of each of these decisions, one could report (a) it reflected an available
but not inevitable interpretation of the statutory language; (b) that the
interpretation almost certainly fell outside the expectations of the APA's
enactors, expectations reflected in the approximately quarter-century of
intervening practice under the statute;5" (c) that the interpretation "made
sense" in light of the emergence of rulemaking as a central policymaking tool, also unexpected in 1946; and (d) that the decision won
prompt acceptance, necessitating no legislative correction. While academic
and judicial critiques of each have emerged over time5' as its consequences
have appeared, one would be hard-pressed to find these critiques
reflected in Congress's occasional recent efforts to amend the APA.
These (unenacted) legislative drafts have tended to build upon, not to
seek retreat from, the judicial developments.52
In the courts of appeals, particularly the District of Columbia circuit,
the APA's skeletal provisions for notice-and-comment procedures in
rulemaking were also revisited. For example, litigation tested when
notice may have been insufficient, because changes occurring as a
47. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
48. ADAPSO v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
49. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
50. E.g., Colorado Interstate Gas Co. V. Federal Power Com., 209 F.2d 717, 72324 (10th Cir. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 492; California Citizens Band
Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 49 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 ("a
notice of rule making is sufficient if it provides a description of the subjects and issues
involved.").
51. E.g., Jerry Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An
Essay on Management, Games and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185

(1994); Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Politicaland Judicial Controls Over
Administrative Action Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1251 (1992).
52.
E.g., Regulatory Reform Act, S. 1080, 97th Cong. (1981), which passed the
Senate by a vote of 94-0 but never made it through the House; also S. 343, 104th Cong.
(1995). See Robert W. Hahn, Achieving Real Regulatory Reform, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
143 (1997); William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle: The "Legislative
Mirage" of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 298 (1996).
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consequence of comments filed by the public gave the adopted rule a
character that could not fairly have been anticipated from its description
in the initial Federal Register proposal. 53 The obligations of review, that
would presently echo through the Supreme Court's recasting of the
standard of review for informal (i.e. non-record) adjudication,54 contributed
to judicial examinations of the statements of basis and purpose required
to accompany rulemakings far more intense than one might think called
the necessary qualities of such statements as
for by language describing
"general and concise",;5 5 these examinations could nonetheless be readily
understood as a reaction to the emerging contemporary significance of
rulemaking on technologically complex and economically significant
matters.
Of particular importance to this discussion, reviewing courts focusing
on the relationship between "facts" and agency judgments began to
speak about the necessary conditions for the testing of the factual
conclusions on which rulemaking rested-the extent to which judges
would take responsibility for assuring the reasonableness of agency
judgments on such matters; whether it was necessary that agency data be
revealed so that commenters could respond to the agency's account of
the state-of-the-world; and, further, if there was to be such an opportunity
for such testing, what the procedures for that testing should be. One can
hardly doubt the quality of judicial innovation occurring here. In testing
the adequacy of the factual grounding for challenged legislation,judges
had learned to ask only if the enacting legislature could have found a
state of facts that would lend support to its policy judgment; and the
standard citation for rulemaking review, dating from the early New Deal,
embraced the same standard.56 It would be hard to find in the APA's
text a repudiation of this approach. Now, for rulemakings, courts began
to demand considerably more.
Congress was a participant in these developments, albeit less directly
than would have made the developments uncontroversially statutory in
character. The Freedom of Information Act (and its subsequent amendments,
and expansion into the Government in the Sunshine Act) voiced a strong
and unequivocal commitment to information exposure, but (as earlier

53.

54.
55.
1968).
56.

Wagner v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, supra note 49.
E.g., Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir.
Pacific States Box and Basket v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).

remarked) this was a commitment not explicitly linked to rulemaking as
such. In statutes establishing particular, important rulemaking regimes,
Congress increasingly provided for what came to be called "hybrid"
rulemaking procedures, which seemed a great deal more like judicial and
less like legislative procedures. 57 For OSHA and for EPA, in many if
not all contexts, Congress specified the basis for judgment (e.g., "best
available technology") in ways that highlighted specific and disputable
factual findings the agency would be required to make; it provided
enhanced procedures (including oral hearings and testimony) for
deciding these issues; and it specified the more demanding "substantial
evidence" standard for judicial review of the results, that is usually
associated with on-the-record proceedings.
When they encountered these special statutory provisions directly,
courts had little difficulty understanding that they imposed more
rigorous standards on both agency proceedings and judicial review.5 8
There was also an observable tendency to generalize these special
provisions, however, at least to the kinds of rulemakings that shared with
EPA and OSHA rulemakings the characteristics of relatively high
economic stakes for industry, technical questions of considerable
uncertainty, and the possibility of major health and safety consequences
for the public.59 Moreover, in articulating the requirements of particular
interest here-the agency's obligation to share with the public, in time
for the comment process, the data that it would consider in deciding
whether to act-the courts invoked neither special statutory language nor
the APA. They framed these obligations on the basis of the judiciary's own
assessment what an acceptable fact-finding process entailed, often
invoking concepts of due process or fundamental fairness.6"
Three D.C. Circuit decisions involving aspects of the Clean Air Act
were prominent in this particular development. Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. EPA,61 written by Judge Harold Leventhal early in 1972 (not long

57.
E.g., the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
of 1975, P.L. 93-637, which was the subject of extensive study and recommendations by
the late Administrative Conference of the United States, see Recommendations 79-1, 79-

5, and 80-1 and their supporting reports in Administrative Conference of the United
States, Recommendations and Reports 1979 and 1980, 44 Fed. Reg. 38, 817 (1979), 45
Fed. Reg. 2, 307 (1980), and Fed. Reg. 46, 772 (1980).
58.
See, e.g., Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
59. E.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.
1977).
60. Id.
61. 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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62
after the Supreme Court's redefinition of the scope of judicial review)
involved secondary ambient air quality standards for sulfur oxides.
Congress had assigned the D.C. Circuit special responsibilities to review
challenges to such standards. The court said these responsibilities entailed a
requirement that the agency explain its reasoning to the court in a
manner that gave a "sufficient indication of the basis on which the
Administrator reached" a result not obviously supported in the rulemaking
record. While the requirement was to explain agency reasoning, rather than
to give notice of data to the parties, meeting the requirement would
cause the EPA to be considerably more public about both its data and the
manner in which it reasoned about it than it had previously been.
Just a year later, Judge Leventhal wrote again in International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,63 a lawsuit challenging the EPA Administrator's
refusal to suspend the coming into effect of new automobile emission
standards for a year. Now-thanks to Kennecott-in possession of a
fuller explanation of the agency's reasoning, he concluded that the
Administrator had not successfully shown that effective control
technology would be available in time for compliance with the
standards, and remanded for further, urgent proceedings on this issue.
Reaching this conclusion required the court to write pages of reasoning
from the record and from the explanations given by the Administrator; it
characterized this extended reasoning as necessary and "hopefully
perceptive, even as to the evidence on technical and specialized
matters, ... to satisfy itself that the agency has exercised a reasoned
discretion, with reasons that do not deviate from or ignore the
ascertainable legislative intent." ' Unsatisfied after its review, the court
sought supplementation of the record. It remarked in the course of doing
so that "in the interest of justice and mutual regard for Congressional
objective, the parties should have opportunity on remand to address
themselves to matters not previously put before them by EPA for
comment." This, Judge Leventhal's opinion said, should include a
chance for the parties to respond to and challenge a technical appendix
EPA had created subsequent to its decision, with "some opportunity for
cross-examination. ",65
These conclusions-which included sharp limitations on that opportunity

62.
63.
64.
65.

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, supra note 49.
478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 648.
Id. at 649.

to cross-examine-were very much the product of the particular
statutory provisions under which the EPA was acting, not the APA.
They began to acquire more general significance, however, with a
concurrence by Chief Judge David Bazelon presenting the problem as a
general one for administrative law. Chief Judge Bazelon thought he lacked
the "technical know-how" to engage in a "substantive evaluation of the
Administrator's assumptions and methodology." 66
Whether or not traditional administrative rules [distinguishing between administrative
adjudication and administrative rulemaking] require it, the critical character of this
decision requires at the least a carefully limited right of cross-examination at the
hearing and an opportunity to challenge the assumptions and methodology
underlying the decision.
The majority's approach permits the parties to challenge the Administrator's
methodology only through the vehicle of judicial review. I do not think this is an
adequate substitute for confrontation prior to the decision. I reach this position not
only out of concern for fairness to the parties . . but also out of awareness of the
limits of our own competence for the task. The petitioners' challenges to the
decision force the court to deal with technical intricacies that are beyond our ken.
These complex questions should be resolved in the crucible of debate through
the
67
clash of informed but opposing scientific and technological viewpoints.

Four months later, in Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckleshaus,68 Judge
Leventhal again addressed the question of party awareness, during the
course of rulemaking, of the data and reports on the basis of which EPA
proposed to act under the Clean Air Act. This case involved a rule EPA
had adopted a few weeks prior to the court's decision in Kennecott
Copper, to set Clean Air Act "stationary source" standards for cement
plants. A petition for review of the rule had already been filed in the
D.C. Circuit when the opinion in Kennecott Copper was announced.
Reading Kennecott Copper led EPA to publish a "supplemental statement"
in the cement case. This supplemental statement gave "a more specific
explanation of how [the Administrator] had arrived at"69 its cement plant
rule. After receiving the supplemental statement, one of the affected
companies, presumably using FOIA,7 ° obtained the details of test results
the statement referred to; it then successfully moved the Court of
Appeals for a remand of the record to the EPA, to permit it to comment
on these tests. It filed its comments; the agency added them to the
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
relevant

Id. at 651.
Id. at 651-52.
486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
Id. at 379.
This seems inevitable, but a variety of efforts to determine the fact-including
FOIA requests-proved unproductive.
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certified record; and EPA then returned the record to the court without
more-without issuing any response of its own or further explanation of
its reasoning. This noticeably annoyed the court, which found the
agency's explanation of its rule inadequate.
Again, the matter was very much caught up with the particular
requirements of the Clean Air Act. In reversing, the court reasoned
largely in terms of what would be necessary to permit the judicial review
called for by that act, a review that "requires enough steeping in technical
matters to determine whether the agency 'has exercised a reasoned
discretion."' 7 1 Yet the court twice addressed the APA's general procedural
requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking:
Written comments were submitted as requested, and as required by the APA
§ 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). Obviously a prerequisite to the ability to make meaningfal
comment is to know the basis upon which the rule is proposed.72

and
It is not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate
rules on the basis 73
of inadequate data, or on data that, critical degree, is known
only to the agency.

Within three years, these dicta had become "obvious"-and generalpropositions about rulemaking. Thus, in 1977 the Second Circuit would
refuse to enforce a 1970 FDA regulation setting health standards for the
processing of fish with the decisive observation that
although we recognize that an agency may resort to its own expertise outside the
record in an informal rulemaking procedure, we do not believe that when the
pertinent research material is readily available and the agency has no special
expertise on the precise parameters involved, there is any reason to conceal the
scientific data relied upon from the interested parties. As Judge Leventhal said in
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (1973): "It is not
consonant with the purpose of a rulemaking proceeding to promulgate rules on the
basis of inadequate data, or on data that [in] critical degree, is known only to the
agency." (Emphasis added.) This is not a case where the agency methodology
was based on material supplied by the interested parties themselves. International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (1973). Here all the scientific
research was collected by the agency, and none of it was disclosed to interested

71.
Id. at 402 (citing Judge Leventhal's earlier opinion in Greater Boston TV v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850, cert. denied 403 U.S. 923 (1971)).
72.
Id. at 393 n.67.
73.
Id. at 393.

parties as the material upon which the proposed rule would be fashioned. ...

Note that the FDA had adopted the challenged rule using ordinary APA
notice-and-comment procedures, rather than statutorily created special
procedures and review standards like EPA's; and it had done so two
years before Kennecott Copper (the first of these decisions). Judge
Leventhal's dicta were apparently not creative judicial law-making, but
simple common sense. In 1977, too, Professor Richard Stewart would
describe the requirement that a rulemaking agency "be prepared to
expose the factual and methodological bases for its decision and face
judicial review on a record that encompasses the contentions and
evidence of the Agency and its opponents" as elements of an uncontroversial
and evidently desirable "paper hearing" procedure, "a procedural tertium
quid. -75

One could not call uncontroversial Chief Judge Bazelon's preference
for more adversary process, as more reflective of judicial limitations.7 6
His dispute with Judge Leventhal about how judges could best review
agency resolutions of such technical matters remained a bone of
contention between them, 77 and Professor Stewart characterized his
views as "far more controversial. 7 8
When Chief Judge Bazelon found a panel to adopt his view, seeming
to require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to engage in more
exacting procedures in a rulemaking on the highly volatile and
technologically complex issues of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Supreme
Court emphatically repudiated him.79 Stressing the original intent of the
APA's provisions, and the impermissibility of judicial embroidery on
the procedures it entailed, the Court's language appeared to place all the
previous decade's developments in jeopardy:
74. We recognize the problem posed by Judge Leventhal in International
Harvester, supra, that a proceeding might never end if such submission required
a reply ad infinitum, ibid. Here the exposure of the scientific research relied on
simply would have required a single round of comment addressed thereto.
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977).
75.
Richard Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional
Law in Judicial Review of Administrative Decisionmaking: Lessons From the Clean Air
Act, 62 IOWA L. REv. 713, 731-33 (1977).
76. See supra text accompanying note 67.
77. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (Bazelon, C.J.), 68 (Leventhal, J.) (D.C.
Cir. en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
78.
See supra note 75, at 731.
79. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). The reader is entitled to know that I was General Counsel of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at the time of the D.C. Circuit announced its
decision, and participated in writing the government's brief in the Supreme Court.
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In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act, which as we have
noted elsewhere was not only "a new, basic and comprehensive regulation of
procedures in many agencies," Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950),
but was also a legislative enactment which settled "long-continued and hardfought contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political
forces have come to rest." Id., at 40. Section 4 of the Act, 5 U.S.C. §553 (1976
ed.), dealing with rulemaking, requires in subsection (b) that "notice of proposed
rule making shall be published in the Federal Register ... ," describes the contents
of that notice, and goes on to require in subsection (c) that after the notice the
agency "shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter
presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general
statement of their basis and purpose.". . . [G]enerally speaking this section of the
Act established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was
willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.
Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their
discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the
agencies have not chosen to grant them. This is not to say necessarily that there
are no circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency
action because of a failure to employ procedures beyond those required by the
statute. But such circumstances, if they exist, are extremely rare.
Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the
"administrative agencies 'should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure
and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their
multitudinous duties."' FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S., at 290, quoting from FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S., at 143. ....
[Reviewing the 1946 legislative history in some detail, the Court uncontroversially
found] little doubt that Congress intended that the discretion of the agencies and
not that of the courts be exercised in determining when extra procedural devices
should be employed.
There are compelling reasons for construing § 4 in this manner. In the first
place, if courts continually review agency proceedings to determine whether the
agency employed procedures which were, in the court's opinion, perfectly tailored
to reach what the court perceives to be the "best" or "correct" result, judicial
review would be totally unpredictable. And the agencies, operating under this
vague injunction to employ the "best" procedures and facing the threat of reversal
if they did not, would undoubtedly adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every
instance. Not only would this totally disrupt the statutory scheme, through which
Congress enacted "a formula upon which opposing social and political forces
have come to rest," Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S., at 40, but all the
inherent advantages of informal rulemaking would be totally lost.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this sort of review fundamentally
misconceives the nature of the standard for judicial review of an agency rule. The
court below uncritically assumed that additional procedures will automatically

result in a more adequate record because it will give interested parties more of an
opportunity to participate in and contribute to the proceedings. But informal
rulemaking need not be based solely on the transcript of a hearing held before an
agency.... [T]his sort of unwarranted judicial examination of perceived
procedural shortcomings of a rulemaking proceeding can do nothing but seriously
interfere with that process prescribed by Congress.

Had Judge Leventhal as well as Chief Judge Bazelon, the uncontroversial
as well as the controversial, thus been repudiated? And if not, now that
attention had been drawn specifically to the language of the APA, how
could Judge Leventhal's conclusions be justified? Despite the emphatic
fervor of the Court's language, the ensuing years have seen no
retrenchment on the proposition that agency data important to proposed
rulemaking is to be revealed in the comment process. Sidestepping the
rhetorical difficulties, the Court seemed to concede the survival of Professor
Stewart's tertium quid when, five years later, it engaged in quite
searching review of the Department of Transportation's technological bases
as it considered a rulemaking involving the requirement that automobiles
contain passive restraints to protect their passengers. 8"
While the survival of the tertium quid may be uncontroversial and
unthreatened, neither the opinions nor the literature generally have
articulated a means of ascribing this result to Congress-of presenting it
as the exercise in statutory interpretation to which the Vermont Yankee
Court understandably says the judiciary is limited. Perhaps, one could
say, this is simply another of the common law's inelegances-that these
judicial interpretations, however unjustifiable in statutory terms, had
become so engrained that the eggs could not be unscrambled. The
Bazelon view remained controversial; it could be repudiated. But Judge
Leventhal's elegant constructions did not elicit the same level of
controversy and a court seeking to undo them would be unraveling too
much.
To make the argument in this way is nonetheless to place the result
outside the statute, to justify it simply as a judicial creation rather than as
the derivative of legislative process. Here, rather, the suggestion is that
by 1972, and certainly after the FOIA amendments of 1974, the APA's
provision for rulemaking procedures (Section 553) could no longer be
viewed as, simply, the product of the judgments made in enacting it in
1946. In particular, what distinguishes Judge Leventhal's propositions
from Chief Judge Bazelon's and permits us to see them, at least in
retrospect, as APA-justified, 8" is the generality and strength of the
80.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983).
81.
The decisions themselves, it is worth recalling, involved a statute, the Clean
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congressional judgments embodied in FOIA. Congress never generalized
its judgment that some high-consequence rulemakings should employ
the hybrid procedures, verging on the judicial, that Chief Judge Bazelon
sought generally to enforce; but the legislative proposition that agencies
must share scientific data and studies in its possession with the interested
public---even if not directed in terms to rulemakings-was inescapable,
uncontroversial, and undifferentiated. A court enforcing that proposition
could do so with considerable confidence that a contemporary legislature
would regard it as the implementation of its own policy judgments, not
as a judicial innovation of questionable merit.8 2
Of course this is easier to argue in 2004 than it may have been to see
in the 1970s, and it is perhaps easier to argue for the developments
respecting APA rulemaking notice than some others. The text of the APA
is unmistakably permissive, requiring only "notice" defined loosely as
we have seen, an opportunity to comment whose dimensions were
explicitly left to agency discretion, and a "concise, general" statement of
basis and purpose. Could a judge accepting that required procedures are
a matter for legislative not judicial judgment have satisfied herself at the
time that changes in the general statutory framework warranted the
tertium quid's demanding interpretations of these statutory requirements?
In the early part of the Twentieth Century, progressive legal scholars
and judges, reacting to the narrowness with which some judges at the
time were treating the statutes emerging with increasing volume and
political force from federal and state legislatures, counseled courts to
treat statutes comparably to the way in which they treated common-law
precedent. For Dean Roscoe Pound, "the orthodox common law attitude
towards legislative innovations" was "not only [to] refuse to reason from
[a statute] by analogy and apply it directly only, but also give to it a
strict and narrow interpretation, holding it down rigidly to those cases
which it covers expressly." Accepting that more liberal courts already
were willing to give statutes a "liberal interpretation," he foresaw-he
Air Act, that set rulemaking procedures for the EPA and judicial review standards for the
court of appeals that in themselves represented a considerable elaboration of the simple
notice-and-comment procedures of the APA.
82. Sunstein et al., supra note 6, at 917-18, contrast the APA, for which congressional
oversight has been at best episodic, with other statutory frameworks such as tax law, that
are characterized by continuous, detailed legislative supervision of judicial outcomes.
Neither setting is, for them, outside the framework of interpretation, although they
understandably expect judicial awareness of congressional engagement to be a factor for
consideration.

sought-a day when they would "receive [a statute] fully into the body
of the law as affording not only a rule to be applied but a principle from
which to reason, and hold it, as a later and more direct expression of the
general will, of superior authority to judge-made rules on the same
general subject; and so reason from it by analogy in preference to
them."83 Benjamin Cardozo, in The Nature of the Judicial Process,
extolled the willingness of judges on the codified continent to "supply
omissions, correct uncertainties and harmonize results with justice
through a method of free decision" that "sees through the transitory
particulars and reaches what is permanent behind them., 8 4 And for
Justice Stone, as well, realizing "the ideal of a unified system of judgemade and statute law woven into a seamless whole by the processes of
adjudication" entailed treating statutes "as starting points for judicial
law-making comparable to judicial decisions."85
The Freedom of Information Act is, from this perspective, a considerably
different source of instruction than particular statutes creating special
procedures for particular agencies. Embodying a general and strenuously
reiterated policy of government obligation to make data in its possession
public, with only limited exceptions and with extraordinary indifference
to the nature of the citizen's claim, it provides an unmistakable source of
the character Pound, Cardozo and Stone evoked. Whatever rulemaking
"notice" may have entailed to the drafters of 1946, in the changed
rulemaking environment of the 1960s FOIA both invited its reshaping
and served to give the judge confidence that her reshaping better fit the
general framework of contemporary law. The Congresses that adopted
FOIA and its amendments were of course not the legislators of 1946; but
they were legislators crafting a considerably more contemporary set of

83.
Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
Recall that this proposition must live with Pound's repudiation of "spurious
interpretation," see supra note 28, and in the framework of his commitment to the
"taught tradition" of the law, see supra note 37. He did not imagine it as a call to
judicial adventurism.
84.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 16-17 (Yale
Univ. Press 1921). See also FRANCOIS GtNY, MTHODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES
EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF (1899). G6ny was among the first to effectively challenge the

mechanical interpretation of statutory codes, arguing for "free scientific research" which
would take legislative purpose and policy, along with the overall social context, as
essential factors in understanding and developing the application of a statute. G&ny's
ideas continue to flourish in such fields as the study of formalism and conceptualism in
legal process and doctrine, the scope and legitimate projection of legislation, the source
of decision-making that rightly lies outside the scope of legislation, and the legal realist
study of the process of law-making.
85.
Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV.
4(1936).
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instructions to the judiciary, also relying on the judges' faithfulness as
servants of the law as they understand it to be. And judicial understandings
are-properly-compounded of contemporary understandings of the
judgments recent Congresses have made, the areas of difficulty that have
emerged in recent law-administration, and the like. Courts need not have
expected thorough revision of all laws arguably affected by laws like
FOLA. That is not the manner in which Congress works or could credibly
be made to work. "Congressmen do not carry the statutes of the United
States around in their heads any more than judges do."86
Just because there has been neither hesitation nor inconsistency in
recent congressional action, FOIA is a particularly easy setting in which
to make an argument like this one. The last-quoted comment, per contra,
was made in a context where one could think the congressional signals
less clear. The issue was whether successful litigants against government
authority in civil rights litigation are entitled to reimbursement of their
expenses for expert witness assistance as well as their attorneys fees.
Congress had sometimes provided explicitly for reimbursement of
experts, and sometimes had used a formula such as "reasonable attorneys
fees as a part of the costs," not specifying what the other costs might be.
These expressions had occurred as elements of an extended judiciallegislative "argument" about proper reimbursement policies in which
attorneys' fees appeared to be the central element at first, and limitations
on other permitted costs emerged only with time.87 The specific
references to expert witness fees multiplied as those limitations did, and
tended to cluster in legislation developed by legislative committees with
environmental responsibilities. This is not the place to chronicle that
dispute or its outcome.88 Note, however, in the following passage from
86.
Freidrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1989) (per Posner, J.).
87.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240 (1975);
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(2); Civil
Rights Attorneys Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1978, 29 U.S.C. §794a(b); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); Smith
v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20
U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987);
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989); Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511
(7th Cir. 1989); West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991);
Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1988(c); Neosho R-V School Dist. v.
Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003).
88.
See Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A
Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of
Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REv. 687 (1992); Neosho R-V School Dist. v.
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the majority opinion sharply,89 repudiating the last-quoted comment,
a certain ambivalence between dynamic and static approaches to
interpretation:
This argument profoundly mistakes our role. Where a statutory term presented
to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible
meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both
previously and subsequently enacted law. We do so not because that precise
accommodative meaning is what the lawmakers must have had in mind (how
could an earlier Congress know what a later Congress would enact?) but because
it is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris. But
where, as here, the meaning of the term prevents such accommodation, it is not
our function to eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy, and to treat
alike subjects that different Congresses have chosen to treat differently ...
Where what is at issue is not a contradictory disposition within the same
enactment, but merely a difference between the more parsimonious policy of an
earlier enactment and the more generous policy of a later one, there is no more
basis for saying that the earlier Congress forgot than for saying that the earlier
Congress felt differently. In such circumstances, the attribution of forgetfulness
rests in reality upon the judge's assessment that the later statute contains the better
disposition. But that is not for judges to prescribe. We thus reject this last
argument for the same reason that Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, once
rejected a similar (though less explicit) argument by the United States:
[The statute's] language is plain and unambiguous. What the Government asks
is not a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the
court, so that what was omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included
within its scope. To supply omissions transcends the judicial function." Iselin
v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250-251 (1926). 9 '

No more violence would have been done to statutory wordsparticularly in the context of the judicial practice common when they
were enacted and the subsequent legislative history-by treating expert
witness fees as an element of permission to award "reasonable attorneys
fees as part of the costs" than not. The remark
Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003) is a quite recent revisiting of the matter in a
compelling context.
89.
489 U.S. 100-01; compare supra text accompanying note 86.
90. WVUH at least asks us to guess the preferences of the enacting Congress.
JUSTICE STEVENS apparently believes our role is to guess the desires of the present
Congress, or of Congresses yet to be. "Only time will tell," he says, "whether the Court,
with its literal reading of §1988, has correctly interpreted the will of Congress." The
implication is that today's holding will be proved wrong if Congress amends the law to
conform with his dissent. We think not. The "will of Congress" we look to is not a will
evolving from Session to Session, but a will expressed and fixed in a particular
enactment. Otherwise, we would speak not of "interpreting" the law but of "intuiting" or
"predicting" it. Our role is to say what the law, as hitherto enacted, is; not to forecast
what the law, as amended, will be.
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where, as here, the meaning of the term prevents such accommodation, it is not
our function to eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy, and to treat
alike subjects that different Congresses have chosen to treat differently
is in my judgment better understood as a commitment to the Court
majority's own strong policy preferences, frequently reiterated in its
"dialogue" with Congress over the years, than as a necessary proposition
about the language Congress had used or the choices it had advertently
made. And the Court's quotation from Justice Brandeis, with its
accompanying footnote, seems to retract the preceding remarks' seeming
openness to dynamic interpretation building on subsequent legislation; it
appears grounded in the proposition that statutes must be treated as
"static" documents, the product only of the Congress that enacted them.
A "faithful servant," observing repeated instructions of the same general
nature but increasing specificity, could conclude that it had been his
interpretation of the "earlier enactment," not the enactment itself, that
had been "parsimonious"-the "more generous policy" of later laws
being not a new thought, but a further specification of earlier
instructions.
Of course courts will encounter difficulties in distinguishing congressional
responses on the order of "what the hell?" from "oops." Nonetheless,
acknowledging that the judicial responsibility is to Congress's judgments (not
to what the judge herself prefers as "the better disposition"), it is
submitted that the judicial obligation is to try. And if the judge finds
herself in repeated conversations of this character, she ought to entertain
the thought that her understandings have been deficient-indeed,
perhaps animated by the same choice of her own preferences as this
passage so emphatically repudiates.
Particularly at the Supreme Court level, the certiorari function has
converted Justice Brandeis' proposition into an amiable fiction that
91
conceals the Court's considerable and disruptive law-making power.
The language quoted from WVUH refers to "a statutory term presented
to us for the first time" (emphasis added). Yet under the present realities
that presentation will ordinarily be greatly delayed in relation to its
presentation in the legal order. Indeed, the delay may be substantially
ascribable to choices by parties and the Court itself that the matter does
not warrant the Court's attention. Brandeis uttered his dictum before the
business of federal courts had become dominated by statutes, before
91.

See Strauss, supra note 4.

their dockets had exploded, and before the certiorari function had taken
effect. The dominant characteristic of particular statutory issues in the
Court today is that they are very infrequently, and usually tardily,
presented. The Court's certiorari choices, like the contemporary Congress's
legislative choices, are driven by the disputes that are live and important
at any given moment. If the uncontroversial is not "presented to us," it
nonetheless becomes a part of the living law known to lawyers advising
clients, to Congress choosing its legislative opportunities, to agencies
deciding how to make procedural choices, and to lower courts that
cannot so easily evade the responsibilities of decision. Were the Court
honestly to face the implications of its reservation of authority to choose
which statutory issues to consider, it might conclude that its refusal to
credit intervening statutory and lower court case-law developments,
more than its insistence on a static view, "profoundly mistakes" its
proper contemporary role.

